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Abstract  
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) (CRPD) has been 
instrumental for initiating and shaping the reform of mental health legislation in many 
countries, including the eight Australian jurisdictions. Multiple approaches have been proposed 
to assess and monitor the compliance of States Parties’ mental health legislation with the 
CRPD, and to evaluate its success in protecting and promoting the human rights of people with 
disabilities. This article reports an effort to index the impact of legislation on human rights by 
measuring changes in the prevalence of compulsory treatment orders applied to people with 
mental illness after the introduction of CRPD influenced mental health legislation in the 
Australian state of Queensland. We found that despite reforms intended to enhance patient 
autonomy, the prevalence of compulsory treatment orders increased after implementation of 
the new legislation. Possible reasons behind this unintended consequence of the legislative 
reform may include a lack of systematized voluntary alternatives to compulsory treatment, a 
paternalistic and restrictive culture in mental health services and risk aversion in clinicians and 
society. We recommend that the reforms in mental health policy as well as legislation need to 
go further in order to achieve the goals embodied in the human rights framework of the CRPD. 
Keywords: Mental health legislation, compulsory treatment, human rights, autonomy, forensic 
orders, mental illness, CRPD 
1 Introduction 
Mental health legislation and its implementation in policies and practice can either 
protect or adversely affect human rights (Gostin & Gable, 2004). While improvements in 
the care and support provided for people with mental illness are mediated by the systems 
and frameworks within individual states, the structure and ongoing refinement of these 
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systems are influenced by the moral suasion of academic and international opinion 
(Callaghan & Ryan, 2012; Donoho, 1992). The United Nations and the World Health 
Organization have a prominent role in gathering information about the determinants of 
health and wellbeing across the world and lead the debate on desirable and acceptable 
practice in the clinical and legal frameworks for the management of mental illness. As a 
result, efforts to protect and promote the human rights of people with mental illness in 
any region must consider not only local legal, social, and administrative features of 
mental health care, but also the international environment within which they occur. This 
article will argue that the successful translation of principles of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) into improvements in the 
health and wellbeing of people requires systematic empirical verification of the effects of 
the CRPD-inspired legislation, alongside analysis of the compliance of States Parties’ 
legislation with the Convention. We discuss these issues within the legislative framework 
of the Australian state of Queensland. 
1.1 The CRPD and the Australian Mental Health Laws  
The CRPD was adopted by the United Nations in New York on 13 December 2006 after a 
process of negotiations among various stakeholders including UN representatives, 
mental health professionals, organizations working in the field and service-user and 
carer bodies, spanning approximately five years (United Nations, 2006). Article 4 of the 
CRPD requires States Parties to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative and other 
measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the Convention. As per 
article 34, a ‘Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (hereafter called the 
CRPD Committee or the Committee) has been established to monitor implementation of 
the CRPD. States Parties are obliged to submit periodic reports about implementation of 
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the Convention to the CRPD Committee. Furthermore, the countries which ratified the 
optional protocol of the CRPD are, as a result, subject to inquiry by the CRPD Committee, 
following communication from individuals or groups indicating serious or systemic 
violations of the Convention (United Nations, 2006).  
Australia ratified the CRPD in July 2008 and the optional protocol in 2009. The CRPD 
entered into force for Australia on 16 August 2008 (Australian Law Reform Commission, 
2013). Australia has a dualist legal system in which the international conventions do not 
become part of Australian law until incorporated into domestic legislation (Australian 
Law Reform Commission, 2014), rather than a monist system, where the international 
conventions become part of the domestic law once the State ratifies the convention 
(Series, 2019). While signing the CRPD also made it obligatory for Australia to amend 
domestic legislation and develop frameworks sufficient for its implementation and 
maintenance, enforcement of breaches of these obligations is problematic. At the time of 
signing the Convention, Australia made an interpretative declaration, which included 
(Australian Law Reform Commission, 2013) – 
Australia declares its understanding that the Convention allows for fully supported or 
substituted decision-making arrangements, which provide for decisions to be made on 
behalf of a person, only where such arrangements are necessary, as a last resort and 
subject to safeguards; and 
Australia further declares that the Convention allows for compulsory assistance or 
treatment of persons, including measures taken for the treatment of mental disability, 
where such treatment is necessary, as a last resort and subject to safeguards. 
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The CRPD Committee has repeatedly urged Australia to withdraw the interpretative 
declarations on articles 12, 17 and 18 of the Convention (United Nations Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2013, 2019). Australia has maintained the 
positions adopted by these interpretative declarations, and retained substitute decision-
making and compulsory psychiatric treatment in guardianship laws as well as mental 
health legislation. 
 
Australia is a federation comprising six states and two territories. While ratification of 
international instruments like the CRPD is enacted by the Commonwealth Government 
representing the national interests of the federation, mental health legislation is enacted 
at state or territory level, with the result that each jurisdiction has a different Mental 
Health Act. At present these eight Acts are broadly similar, including in the influence of 
the CRPD on their most recent revisions. Each jurisdiction’s legislation includes 
provisions that establish the conditions under which compulsory psychiatric treatment 
may be required of patients experiencing mental illness, which may include periods of 
compulsory admission to hospital as well as periods of adherence to treatment while 
living in the community. 
 
By world standards, community treatment order (CTO) use in Australia is high and rising, 
with considerable variations across states (Light, 2019; Light, Kerridge, Ryan, & 
Robertson, 2012). For example, in Queensland the percentage of community mental 
health contacts in the public sector which were compulsory increased from just under 
9% in 2005-6 to 22% in 2016-17 (Figure 1) (Kisely, Moss, Boyd, & Siskind, 2020). By 
contrast, the proportion of compulsory community contacts in Western Australia over 
the same period never exceeded 4% (Figure 1). Studies of the effectiveness of compulsory 
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treatment have been limited to CTOs as opposed to forensic orders. A Cochrane 
systematic review of the impact of CTOs on the outcomes for patients with mental illness 
found only three randomised controlled trials, two from the United States and one from 
Great Britain (Kisely, Campbell, & O'Reilly, 2017).  CTOs did not reduce health service use 
or improve social functioning, psychiatric symptoms, quality of life or satisfaction with 
care. Studies in Australia have been restricted to analyses of administrative data 
comparing people on CTOs with voluntary controls using matching or multivariate 
techniques to adjust for confounding. Results have been mixed with any benefit requiring 
a minimum of two years’ use (Burgess et al., 2006; Harris et al., 2019; Kisely et al., 2020; 
Kisely et al., 2013; Kisely, Xiao, & Preston, 2004; Segal, Hayes, & Rimes, 2017). The 
effectiveness of compulsory inpatient treatment has never been formally assessed, given 
the practical and ethical difficulties of finding suitable controls for a study.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
1.2 Queensland Mental Health Legislation  
Queensland has had a series of laws legislating the treatment of mental illness since the 
Lunacy Act of 1869 which instituted reception houses which would accommodate people 
who were, or were likely to be, committed to an asylum.1  Major revisions in 1962, 1974, 
1985, and 2000 expanded access to services, and added safeguards such as a Mental 
Health Tribunal which determined a criminal offender’s suitability for a mental health 
                                                        
1 Lunacy Act 1869 (Qld). 
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defense.2 Replacing the 1974 Act, the Mental Health Act 2000 (MHA 2000) added a 
definition of mental illness;3 the concept of capacity and the need for immediate 
assessment or treatment in a  ‘no less restrictive way’.4 It also allowed ambulance officers 
to transport persons to a mental health facility for an involuntary assessment where it 
was previously restricted to police officers.5 The MHA 2000 introduced involuntary 
treatment in the community,6 provided a statement of rights which was to be made 
available to patients and enshrined regulations on prohibited treatments, seclusion and 
restraints.7 This Act permitted involuntary treatment orders (ITOs) both where patients 
lacked the capacity to make decisions about their own health-care, and where they had 
unreasonably refused care without reference to capacity.8 
 
The Queensland Mental Health Act 2016 (MHA 2016), which replaced the Mental Health 
Act 2000 (MHA 2000), was intended to improve the human rights of patients, including 
by minimizing compulsory treatment (Queensland Health, 2017). Section 3(2) states that 
‘the main objects (of this Act) are to be achieved in a way that safeguards the rights of 
persons and is least restrictive of rights and liberties of a person who has a mental illness.’ 
We aimed to explore if the MHA 2016 has been successful in that objective, by measuring 
the prevalence of compulsory treatment orders. 
                                                        
2 Mental Health Act 1974 (Qld) s 28b.  
3 Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) s 12. 
4 Ibid s 9, 14.  
5 Ibid s 33. 
6 Ibid s 109.  
7 Ibid s 344, 162.  
8 Ibid s 14(1f).  
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The MHA 2016 has three categories of compulsory treatment order – Forensic Order 
(FO), Treatment Support Order (TSO) and Treatment Authority (TA). Patients who have 
been diverted from the criminal justice system before trial as a result of unsoundness of 
mind or unfitness for trial due to a mental illness may be managed under a FO or a TSO. 
These orders are initiated by a specially constituted mental health court, presided over 
by a judge assisted by two psychiatrists. Most patients subject to compulsory treatment 
are not involved with the criminal justice system. For these patients a third type of order 
called a ‘Treatment Authority’ (TA) is used when a psychiatrist determines that the 
person has a mental illness, lacks capacity to consent to treatment and there is an 
imminent risk of harm to self or others or risk of serious mental or physical deterioration 
in the absence of involuntary treatment. Each type of order can be in place during 
inpatient or community episodes of care. All are subject to periodic review (every six or 
twelve months) by a Mental Health Review Tribunal (MHRT) comprising a psychiatrist, a 
lawyer, and an appointed community member. A TA can be revoked by the treating 
psychiatrist, whereas an FO or TSO can only be revoked by the MHRT. The following 
tables describe the requirements for compulsory treatment under each type of order. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The TSO was created by the MHA 2016 as a step-down from a FO (Queensland Health 
Office of the Chief Psychiatrist, 2020a, 2020b). Both the FO and TSO can be either 
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inpatient- or community-based,9  but the TSO is considered to be less restrictive10 because 
it is presumed that it will be of the community category unless the Mental Health Court 
believes it necessary for the patient to be in hospital, while it is presumed that a FO will 
be inpatient unless the Mental Health Court is satisfied that there is not unacceptable risk 
to the community. Furthermore, the treating psychiatrist can change the category of TSO 
from inpatient to community, whereas for FOs, the treating psychiatrist has to apply to 
the MHRT to request a change of category from inpatient to community.  
 
While the intention of introducing TSOs was to reduce the time spent under the most 
restrictive category of compulsory treatment, moving from an FO to a TSO may not have 
a significant impact on a patient’s experiences or perceived level of autonomy. Table 3 
shows that the clinical criteria for FOs and TSOs are identical, and the main differences 
between the orders are procedural. For example, FO hearings before the MHRT require a 
representative of the Attorney General (AG), but TSO hearings do not. Furthermore, FOs 
require regular six-monthly reviews by an ad-hoc Acute Risk Management Committee 
(ARMC) comprising key members of the treating team and senior representatives of the 
clinical governance framework of the local mental health service; but ARMC review is 
required for TSOs only if there is a significant risk issue, a change of circumstances, or a 
plan to revoke the Order (Queensland Health Office of the Chief Psychiatrist, 2020a, 
2020b). As the major difference between an FO and a TSO is that under a FO the decision 
whether to treat a patient in an inpatient facility or in the community is removed from 
the psychiatrist, introduction of the TSO has increased the clinical discretion of 
                                                        
9 Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) s 138, 139, 140, 145. 
10 Ibid s 130. 
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psychiatrists without necessarily increasing patient autonomy. As the legislative criteria 
as well as the patient experiences under FOs and TSOs are essentially identical, we 
consider them together. 
 
The Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) (MHA) Schedule 3 defines a forensic patient as ‘a 
person subject to a forensic order’ and lists three types of forensic order (FO): ‘mental 
health’, ‘disability’ and ‘criminal code’, which have been described in the Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 3 here  
 
2 Interpretation of the CRPD article 12 
The extent to which Queensland legislation complies with international standards is 
significantly influenced by how the CRPD is interpreted. Of central importance are article 
12 - ‘persons with disabilities have the right to equal recognition before the law’; article 14 
- ‘the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty’; and article 17 
- ‘every person with disability has a right to respect for his or her physical and mental 
integrity on an equal basis with others’ (Callaghan & Ryan, 2014; United Nations, 2006). 
General comment 1 (GC 1) on article 12 issued by the CRPD Committee interprets article 
12 as proscribing compulsory treatment in all circumstances (United Nations Committee 
on CRPD, 2014). As noted above, the Committee has repeatedly stated that Australia’s 
interpretative declaration and Australian mental health laws violate the CRPD by 
allowing substitute decision-making (United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, 2013, 2019). The CRPD Committee argues that when a patient with 
limited capacity is faced by a health decision, efforts should focus on optimizing their 
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capacity to decide by providing meaningful information at an appropriate level of detail 
with adequate cognitive and social supports (supported decision-making) rather than 
identifying the best person or institution to make a decision on their behalf (substitute 
decision-making). 
 
The practical, legal, and ethical implications of GC 1 have received considerable attention. 
The CRPD Committee asserts that individual autonomy, will and preferences must be 
respected for all people, with supported decision-making implemented in place of 
substituted decision-making in all circumstances (United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014). Others have argued that for people with 
varying degrees of mental capacity, full access to the right to refuse treatment may 
sometimes disrupt the right to access optimal health care. As a result, failing to account 
for decision-making capacity in some cases may jeopardize the right to the highest 
attainable standards of physical and mental health, social inclusion and adequate 
standard of living (Callaghan & Ryan, 2014; Freeman et al., 2015; Gill, 2019). While there 
appears to be general agreement that supported decision-making should be the standard 
in almost all circumstances, this debate remains unresolved in situations where an 
individual completely lacks decision-making capacity. The CRPD Committee argues that 
these situations should be managed by a “best interpretation” of the person’s will and 
preferences, while critics note that this appears to be a form of substitute judgement, with 
the corollary that the CRPD cannot be interpreted as completely prohibiting substitute 
judgement (Craigie et al., 2019). The debate is complicated by inconsistencies between 
the CRPD and other international instruments and UN entities (Guilloud, 2019).  
Given this background, one approach acknowledges the crucial importance of patient 
autonomy, by minimizing constraints on both the right to refuse treatment and the right 
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to receive treatment. Consistent with article 12(4) of the CRPD, this approach highlights 
that measures limiting the exercise of legal capacity must be tailored to the person’s 
circumstances, free of conflict of interest or undue influence and subject to safeguards 
and independent monitoring. They must also respect the person’s rights, will and 
preferences, and apply for the shortest possible time. This is consistent with the 
compromise suggested by Dawson (2015) and others, that while supported decision-
making should be the default approach, substitute decision-making, including 
compulsory treatment, must be available as a last resort, under exceptional 
circumstances, with strong safeguards (Callaghan & Ryan, 2014; Dawson, 2015; Freeman 
et al., 2015; Gill, 2019). This empirical analysis of MHA 2016 is based on this 
interpretation of the CRPD. 
 
Freeman et al. (2015) have argued that an insistence on the immutable presence of legal 
capacity is particularly problematic for the management of those who commit legal 
offences while lacking capacity. This position would prevent diversion of mentally ill 
offenders from the criminal justice system to mental health and welfare systems 
(Freeman et al., 2015). The MHA 2016 does not adopt this position, but seeks to balance 
the rights of autonomy and wellbeing by encouraging supported decision-making where 
possible, by limiting the instances in which compulsory treatment can be ordered, and by 
imposing stringent safeguards in its use. This includes the use of the least restrictive 
conditions for the shortest time, with frequent review by the MHRT, independent of the 
treating team and service.  
2.1 Compliance of Queensland mental health legislation with the CRPD 
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A strong criticism of the MHA 2000 was that it allowed compulsory treatment where a 
patient who retained full mental capacity had ‘unreasonably refused’ treatment in the 
judgement of a psychiatric doctor, with no definition of unreasonable refusal (Gill, Allan, 
Clark, & Rosen, 2020). In evaluating this criticism, it is useful to compare the application 
and consequences of relying upon “unreasonable refusal” as opposed to “lack of capacity” 
to justify substitute judgement in treatment decisions. While under the MHA 2000 both 
criteria were based upon the judgement of a qualified doctor, the former refusal was 
unrelated to established clinical or legal practices, precedents, or theories and was 
therefore subjective. By contrast, the assessment of capacity is a specific clinical skill that 
is a standard component of medical curricula, as well as a well-established legal concept 
routinely applied in criminal and civil law. Perhaps more importantly, unreasonable 
refusal did not specify a lack of capacity but that the patient’s decisions were 
unacceptable to an individual doctor at a particular point in time.  
 
Decisions about compulsory treatment in the context of mental illness are often made in 
emergency situations, with incomplete information, and may be associated with serious 
harm to patients and others. A clause which allowed compulsory treatment despite 
capacity based entirely on a subjective opinion led to conflicts of interest by allowing 
doctors the discretion to prioritize immediate risk reduction over patient’s right to 
autonomous action.  
 
While the “unreasonably refused” criterion unequivocally violated patients’ right to 
refuse treatment, it also could not be justified by the compromise approach described 
above, as a patient with mental capacity has both the legal right and the mental ability to 
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determine what constitutes optimal care, so neither supported nor substitute judgement 
can apply.  
 
Responding to this line of criticism, the MHA 2016 removed the “unreasonably refused” 
clause11 and emphasized patients’ ability to understand the nature of the illness and 
treatment, the consequences of not receiving treatment, and the ability to make and 
communicate a decision. In limiting the instances that justify compulsory treatment, the 
MHA 2016 therefore took a welcome step towards recognizing the principle of individual 
autonomy (Gill, Allan, Clark, & Rosen, 2020). Furthermore, the MHA 2016 gave people 
with disabilities the right to be assisted by another person in achieving the understanding 
necessary to have capacity under the Act. This represents a shift towards supported 
decision-making as advocated by the CRPD Committee through the General Comment 1 
on article 12 (United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014).  
 
The MHA 2016 increased the emphasis on treating patients in the least restrictive 
manner. Less restrictive options than compulsory treatment include treating according 
to an advance health directive and administering treatment with the consent of a 
guardian or attorney, where available.12  While these provisions do not achieve the move 
from substitute to supported decision-making for all patients lacking mental capacity 
required by the CRPD, they do expand the group of patients for whom supported 
decision-making is feasible, and attempt to increase all patients’ control over their 
treatment. They explicitly require treating doctors to consider and use in their reasoning 
                                                        
11 Mental Health Act 2016 s 12(1b). 
12 Ibid s 13(1). 
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the impact of clinical and legal decisions including compulsory treatment on patients’ and 
others’ rights to safety, autonomy and best possible treatment. The Act’s recognition of 
supported decision-making is enhanced by the appointment of nominated support 
persons.13 All these options expand the autonomy of the patient — by permitting the 
patient to have a direct say in their treatment and through the effective creation of an 
agency that acts in accordance with the will and preference of the patient.  
 
Another novel feature of the MHA 2016 is the express recognition of the rights of patients 
and others.  These include patients’ rights to be visited by nominated support persons 
and family,14 and by their health practitioner or legal advisors.15 The Act also gives 
patients a right to a second opinion about their treatment. Furthermore, the Act requires 
the Chief Psychiatrist to prepare statements of rights that are widely available.16 
 
The MHA 2000 required a mandatory psychiatrist report regarding unsoundness of mind 
and fitness for trial whenever any patient subject to compulsory treatment was charged 
with an offence, in order to allow for the diversion of patients from the criminal justice 
system to appropriate treatment.17 While diversion was intended to improve patient 
access to care, and avoid legal and ethical dilemmas arising from involving patients with 
limited mental capacity in legal processes such as advising counsel, making a plea, and 
participating in a trial, diversion can also have negative consequences for patients. Most 
                                                        
13 Ibid s 223, 224. 
14 Ibid s 281. 
15 Ibid s 282, 283. 
16 Ibid s 277, 278, 279, 290. 
17 Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) s 238. 
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fundamentally, patients diverted to treatment after being accused of an alleged offense 
are never subject to the processes of investigation and trial that might establish their 
innocence. Many patients diverted to forensic psychiatric treatment from the criminal 
justice system prefer the certainty of a jail sentence to the open ended timeframe of 
admission. MHA 2016 removed the mandatory request for a psychiatrist report, and 
returned the decision whether to request such a report to patients and advocates, should 
they prefer to access a ‘mental health defense’  (unsoundness of mind at the time of the 
alleged offence or unfitness for trial), instead of resolving matters through the criminal 
justice system.18 By removing the mandatory psychiatrist’s report, MHA 2016 has 
increased patients’ influence over whether they should be diverted from the criminal 
justice system to treatment. The only exception is that MHA 2016 allows the Chief 
Psychiatrist to request a psychiatrist report to protect public safety.19 
 
Together, the reforms of the MHA 2016 attempted to improve compliance with the CRPD 
by removing the option to initiate compulsory treatment for “unreasonable refusal” of 
treatment, facilitating supported decision-making, requiring the least restrictive means 
of treatment possible, and increasing autonomy regarding diversion from the criminal 
justice system.  The MHA 2016 mechanisms enhancing the human rights of people with 
mental illness are outlined in Table 4.  
 
A qualitative study that interviewed patients and their advocates as well as clinicians and 
other stakeholders about the impact of MHA 2016 on experiences of care and caring 
                                                        
18 Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) s 20. 
19 Ibid s 92, 93. 
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reported that while all parties had positive responses to the intended effects of the 
legislative changes, their experiences were not consistent with significant changes in 
service practice or patient outcomes. Participants speculated that the limited impact of 
legislative change on lived experiences might include: a) barriers to implementation, such 
as a risk averse culture within the tribunals with oversight of compulsory treatment, a 
lack of relevant expertise or training in staff expected to implement the legislation, and 
unanticipated procedural problems leading to adjournments and other delays; and b) a 
lack of specific safeguards in the legislation, such as limited mechanisms for advocates to 
challenge physical and chemical restraint of patients (Giuntoli et al., 2019). 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
3 Measuring the impact of legislation on human rights 
Implementation of principles embodied in human rights treaties may be illusory and not 
automatically achieve the intended ends. (Posner, 2014). In addition, Guilloud (2019) has 
highlighted the inconsistency between the CRPD Committee’s position on the compulsory 
treatment of those with disabilities and that of the Human Rights Committee, which 
appears to have endorsed compulsory treatment as the last resort where disability is 
accompanied by risk (Guilloud, 2019). Although Guilloud notes that the principle of lex 
specialis derogat legi generali (‘special law repeals general laws’) suggests the CRPD 
should have primacy in the area of disability, these inconsistencies may be used by States 
Parties to justify non-implementation of the Convention’s more challenging aspects 
including the proscription of compulsory treatment.  As the impact of international law 
on individual outcomes is complicated not just by the fidelity of implementation, but by 
 18 
contested areas of the law itself, we argue that empirical data are required to evaluate 
how changes to legislation motivated by the CRPD affect human rights outcomes. In the 
absence of data, reform will be driven purely by theoretical considerations which do not 
guarantee improved access to human rights. To this end we assessed the impact of MHA 
2016 on the human rights of patients in Queensland managed under compulsory 
psychiatric treatment.  
 
We specifically investigated if the legislative changes of the MHA 2016 resulted in a shift 
away from substitute decision-making in clinical practice, as required by the CRPD. We 
conducted an observational study design comparing the number of FOs, TSOs and TAs in 
the three years before the implementation of the Act in March 2017, i.e. the period from 
1st of July 2013 to 30th of June 2016, to the corresponding numbers in the three years 
subsequent, from 1st of July 2017 to 30th of June 2020.  The financial year of 2016 to 2017 
was not included in this study as both the MHA 2016 and MHA 2000 were in effect for 
different parts of this year. For each financial year during this period, the following 
numbers were recorded:  
- the number of FOs and TAs made during the year;   
- the number of FOs and TAs ended during the year; 
- The number and proportion of MHRT hearings that resulted in revocation of FOs 
and TAs by the MHRT; and 
- the total number of FOs and TAs at the end of the financial year. 
- Since the MHA 2016 introduced the new category called Treatment Support 
Orders (TSOs) as described above, the total number of TSO’s at the end of financial 
years after the implementation of MHA 2016 were also recorded (i.e. on 30 June 
2018, 2019 and 2020). 
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- The number of TSO’s at the end of each financial year after the implementation of 
the MHA 2016 was added to the corresponding number of FO’s, given the criteria 
of TSO and FO are identical, as described above. 
 
All data were sourced from the Chief Psychiatrist Annual Report and the MHRT Annual 
Report published for each financial year by the Office of the Chief Psychiatrist Queensland 
and the MHRT respectively. Prevalence of FOs and TAs at the end of each financial year 
was calculated using Queensland population data sourced from the Queensland 
Government Statistician’s Office. 
 
Forensic Orders: 
Table 5 outlines the number and prevalence of FOs and TSOs during six financial years 
(2013-2020). One financial year (1 July 2016 – 30 June 2017) has been omitted owing to 
the implementation of the Mental Health Act during this year on 5 March 2017.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
There was an increase in the number of FOs in the three years before the implementation 
of the MHA 2016, however this increase was not statistically significant. In the three years 
following the implementation of the MHA 2016, confidence intervals reveal a significant 
increase in the total number of FOs and TSOs, considered together. Whilst the total 
number of FOs decreased in the years 2018-2020 compared to the previous year, the 
larger increase in the number of TSOs continued the upward trend. 
 
Treatment Authorities  
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Table 6 outlines the number and prevalence of TAs during six financial years (2013-
2020). One financial year (1 July 2016 – 30 June 2017) has been omitted again as 
explained above.  
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
 
Table 6 demonstrates a continued upward trend in the number of TAs made, total TAs 
and prevalence of TAs despite the introduction of many less restrictive practices in the 
MHA 2016. The number of new TAs made consistently increased from 2013 to 2016 in 
the three years preceding the MHA 2016. In the year subsequent to the enactment of the 
MHA 2016, there was a slight decrease in the new TAs issued, however, there was a 
greater decrease in the TAs ended, leading to an overall increase in the total number and 
prevalence of TAs. In 2018-2019 and 2019-2020, the new TAs as well as TAs ended 
increased but the trend of an overall increase in total numbers and prevalence of TAs 
continued. The increase in prevalence of TAs has been more significant after the 
introduction of the MHA 2016, than the years preceding it.  
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
As evidenced by Table 7, approximately 1% of TA reviews by the MHRT resulted in 
revocation in the last three financial years after the introduction of the MHA 2016. There 
has been a steady decrease in the revocations resulting from MHRT reviews, from 2.35% 
in 2013-2014, to between 1.01% and 1.08% in 2017-2020. With respect to the FOs, 
between 3.45% and 4.66% of the Forensic Orders were revoked by the MHRT per year 
before the introduction of MHA 2016. The introduction of the MHA 2016 did not 
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significantly change the number of revocations of FOs (4.06% to 4.54%) after the 
introduction of MHA 2016. Before MHA 2016, revocation of a FO resulted in discharge 
from the forensic psychiatry system. With the introduction of TSOs in the MHA 2016, 
most revocations of FOs led to institution of a TSO. As a result, the introduction of the 
“step-down” category of the TSO has paradoxically increased the amount of time spent 
by patients within the forensic psychiatry system.  
 
4 Discussion 
We found that compulsory treatment in the form of FOs, TSOs and TAs is on the rise in 
Queensland in spite of a number of mechanisms to promote less restrictive treatment in 
MHA 2016, consistent with a qualitative study of patient and carer experiences of 
compulsory treatment following its implementation (Giuntoli et al., 2019). The gap 
between the legislation’s intentions and outcomes illustrates the need for empirical 
verification of the effects of legislation and the limits of what can be achieved by 
legislation alone. Having identified this unintended consequence of MHA 2016, it is now 
possible to look for remedies and systemic reforms. Future legislative changes can then 
be guided by evidence on the practicalities of implementation and their impact on 
patients’ rights. Causes of this unintended consequence of rise in compulsory treatment 
may include a lack of systematized and well-resourced voluntary alternatives, a 
paternalistic and restrictive culture in mental health services, and risk aversion in 
clinicians and society (Gill, Allan, Clark, & Rosen, 2020). In addition, poor understanding 
of the concept of capacity to consent to treatment may contribute to the fact that 
legislative reform does not appear to be translating into increased access to rights (Ryan, 
2019). Further systematic inquiry is required around the possible determinants of the 
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rise of compulsory treatment and effective ways to reduce compulsory treatment and 
promote voluntary and less restrictive care. It is likely that despite introducing some less 
restrictive ways and supported decision-making provisions, the changes in Queensland 
legislation do not go far enough. We recommend that the reforms in mental health policy 
as well as legislation need to go further in order to achieve the goals embodied in the 
human rights framework of the CRPD. 
 
The increase in FOs that we found is of concern and has several implications for individual 
rights. For instance, MHA 2016 allows the Mental Health Court to impose a non-
revocation period on a FO of up to 10 years, ostensibly for the purpose of protecting the 
community.20  This is a compromise between the right of patients not to be subject to an 
indefinite period of detention in the absence of responsibility for a crime, and the right of 
the community to safety, but raises the question how FOs balance the goals of therapeutic 
and criminal justice systems. As noted by Guilloud (2019), the CRPD Committee found in 
Noble v. Australia that the compulsory treatment of an Aboriginal Australian with a 
mental and intellectual disability including incarceration without trial for more than a 
decade was a violation of the CRPD.21 It was estimated that had he been found guilty of 
the charges made, Mr Noble would likely have received a sentence of around three years, 
and therefore loss of the right to trial had significantly affected his wellbeing. This 
illustrates the extremely serious effect of a non-revocation period of up to 10 years on 
                                                        
20 Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) s 137 
21 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 
of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No 7/2012 Noble v. Australia, CRPD/C/16/D/7/2012 
(2 September 2016). 
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the rights of patients who by that fact lose the right to defend their innocence as well as 
the other procedural rights to reviews of detention during that period.  
 
FOs differ significantly from TAs in that basic clinical decisions including inpatient versus 
community treatment and adequate risk management are routinely imposed by the 
Mental Health Court or MHRT based on the assessment whether there is ‘an unacceptable 
risk to the safety of the community’.22 This framework can lead to extended periods of 
hospitalization or on the community category of a FO, based on risk categorization, often 
in the absence of psychopathology, particularly where patients engage in periodic 
substance abuse. With the rationale that greater attention to and comprehensive 
management of the sources of risk would reduce the need for Forensic Orders for some 
patients, an additional step was introduced to the review process, called the Assessment 
and Risk Management Committee (ARMC). Involving more professionals on more 
occasions appears more likely to slow the progress towards greater patient autonomy 
than to materially improve risk reduction or clinical care. Extended periods of 
compulsory treatment in such cases violate patients’ individual autonomy, liberty and 
integrity as identified in the CRPD articles 12, 14 and 17. Furthermore, whereas a TA can 
only be ordered if someone lacks mental capacity, a FO may be continued even after the 
individual has regained that capacity, as revocation requires the MHRT to conclude that 
the patient is not an unacceptable risk to the safety of the community. While the risks 
associated with patients managed under FOs may arise in part from mental illness, for 
many patients there are also risk factors unrelated to illness, including premorbid and 
                                                        
22 Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) s 138(2). 
 24 
persisting personality traits, learned behaviors, substance abuse, and social 
circumstances predisposing to high risk activities.  
 
As a result, risk assessment of patients managed under FOs can be highly uncertain and 
psychiatrists and MHRT working in a risk-averse system may be biased against assuming 
responsibility for revoking the FOs. A qualitative study by Giuntoli et al. (2019) reported 
that FO patients with a dual diagnosis of mental illness and intellectual disability had 
prolonged periods of compulsory treatment due to a lack of appropriate forensic beds 
(Giuntoli et al., 2019).  A consequence is that certain patients remain on FOs for much 
longer than the time they would have served had they gone through the normal legal 
process after an alleged offence. This underlies several complaints made by patients 
under FOs: that in the absence of a trial the claim that they have committed an offence is 
never tested and guilt is assumed; that diversion from the criminal justice system 
prevents them from accessing discounted sentences by pleading guilty (New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission, 2013); and that they would prefer the certainty of a prison 
sentence to the uncertainty of admission under a FO. Such criticisms are consistent with 
the CRPD Committee’s interpretation of article 12 in the context of criminal proceedings. 
While we do not agree that this calls for a complete ban on diversion from criminal system 
to mental health system as argued by the CRPD Committee, our findings point towards 
the need for further legislative and policy reform to protect and promote the human 




The ultimate goal of international legal instruments like the CRPD is to materially 
improve the human rights and wellbeing of people, including people living with 
disabilities. Success depends on the specifics of the legislation used by States Parties to 
implement the international instruments, which must accommodate prevailing tensions 
between maximizing the autonomy of people with disabilities, ensuring the equity of 
access to care, and the practical difficulties of ending substitute decision-making for 
people with severely affected judgement. Inconsistencies in international law complicate 
the implementation of legislation, and may provide States Parties with greater discretion 
to avoid difficult requirements such as a move to supported decision-making.  
 
This article has shown that legislation intended to improve the human rights of people 
with disabilities in Queensland has been associated with an increase, not a decrease, in 
the number of people subject to compulsory psychiatric treatment. Possible reasons 
behind this increase could include lack of systematized voluntary alternatives, restrictive 
culture of mental health services and high risk-aversion in mental health services as well 
as society at large. It is also likely that the legislative reform has not gone far enough and 
hence there is a need for further legislative and policy reform. We have observed that 
some patients remain under Forensic Orders for longer, and sometimes much longer, 
than would be justified by their clinical illness or alleged infractions alone, due to sources 
of risk such as substance misuse and learned behavior.  
 
We recommend further empirical research, qualitative as well as quantitative, into the 
increase in compulsory treatment and forensic orders in Queensland. The uptake of other 
less restrictive measures should also be evaluated. The intersections between human 
rights legislation, mental health services, and systems of justice are complex and 
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extremely variable. We argue that the implementation of any legislation intended to 
improve human rights should always be assessed using empirical indices such as those 
considered here, as well as qualitative research, alongside compliance with relevant 
international instruments including the CRPD. Ideally, the indices would be developed at 
the same time as legislation, with a plan for periodic review to ensure that the legislation 
has achieved its goals, and to facilitate resolution of inconsistencies in international laws 
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The person has a mental illness. [s12(1)(a)] 
Lack of Capacity to 
Consent 
The person does not have capacity to consent to 
be treated for the illness. [s12(1)(b)] 
Harm/Risk Because of the person’s illness, the absence of 
involuntary treatment, or the absence of 
continued involuntary treatment, is likely to 
result in: imminent serious harm to the person 
or others; or the person suffering serious mental 
or physical deterioration. [s12(1)(c)] 
AND  
No Less Restrictive Alternative 
There is no less restrictive way for the person to 

























Under a TA Under a FO Under a TSO 
Current mental 
illness 
Yes –– –– 
Lack of capacity 
to consent to 
treatment 




Yes –– –– 
Unsoundness of 
mind at the time 





–– Yes Yes 
Risk  Imminent risk of serious 
harm or mental/physical 
deterioration. 
Unacceptable risk to 
the safety of the 
community, including 
risk of serious harm 
to other persons or 
property. 
Unacceptable risk to 
the safety of the 
community, including 
risk of serious harm 
to other persons or 
property. 
 
Table 2: Criteria for compulsory treatment under Treatment Authority (TA), Forensic 
Order (FO) and Treatment Support Order (TSO).  
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FO (criminal code) FO (disability) FO (mental health) 
Orders made by the Supreme 
Court or District Court under 
the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) 
[s645(1), s647(1)]: 
Orders made by the Mental 
Health Court under the MHA 
[s134(3)(b)]: 
Orders made by the Mental 
Health Court under the MHA. 
[s134(3)(a)]: 
If the jury find that the person is 
not of sound mind… the court is 
required to order the person to 
be admitted to an authorised 
mental health service to be 
dealt with under the Mental 
Health Act 2016.  
 
Note: The registrar of the court 
that made the forensic order 
(Criminal Code) must, within 7 
days after the order is made, 
give notice of the order in the 
approved form to: 
a) The Chief Psychiatrist 
b) The MHRT 
(MHA [s190]) 
The person’s unsoundness of 
mind was, or unfitness for trial 
is, because of an intellectual 
disability; and  
the person needs care for the 
person’s intellectual disability 
but does not need treatment 
and care for any mental 
illness.  
The person’s unsoundness of 
mind was, or unfitness for trial is, 
because of a mental condition 
other than an intellectual 
disability; or 
the person has a dual disability 
and needs involuntary treatment 
and care for the person’s mental 
illness, as well as care for the 
person’s intellectual disability.  
 




Mechanism   Explanation  
Patient rights advisers  x Each health service is required to appoint an independent patient rights 
adviser who is not an employee of the mental health service  
x The adviser informs the patient and their support persons of their rights 
and responsibilities  
x The adviser works with the patient and support persons to 
communicate the patient’s views, wishes and preferences to the 
healthcare team  
Statement of rights  x The Chief Psychiatrist is required to prepare a written statement on the 
rights of patients and their support persons, and information on the 
procedure for making complaints 
x The statement is explained to the patient upon admission. A copy is also 
given to the patient or their support person  
Defining capacity  x A person is presumed to have capacity to make decisions for their 
treatment unless proven otherwise 
x A person has capacity if they can understand in general terms: that they 
have a mental illness; the nature and purpose of the treatment for the 
illness; the benefits, risks and alternatives to the treatment; and, the 
consequences of not receiving treatment  
x Assistance from others in achieving the understanding necessary to 
have capacity is permitted. This enables supported decision-making  
Less restrictive 
treatment  
x A treatment authority can only be issued if there is no less restrictive 
way of treatment  
x Less restrictive ways of treatment include consent from a minor’s 
parents, an advanced health directive which states the patient’s views, 
consent from an attorney appointed by the patient or consent from a 
guardian appointed to the patient 
Responsibilities for 
treatment and care  
x Doctors must discuss with the patient the treatment and care they are to 
be provided under a treatment authority  
x Doctors must consider the views, wishes and preferences of the patient 
in deciding treatment under a treatment authority 
x A treatment authority must be reviewed by a doctor at least every 3 
months   
Right to information  x It is required that the patient be informed of when a recommendation 
for assessment has been made, the treatment and care to be provided 
under a treatment authority and the regular assessment of a treatment 
authority  
Rights as an inpatient  x The MHA 2016 enshrines the rights to be visited by a support person at 
any reasonable time, to be visited and examined by a health practitioner 
and to be visited by a legal or other adviser 
x It also enshrines the right to communicate with others 
Complaints and second 
opinions 
x A patient may request a second opinion on treatment and care from an 
independent health practitioner  
Nominated support 
persons  
x A person may nominate support persons for when they are an inpatient  
x The support person can participate in the decision’s regarding 
treatment and care, and will receive information about the patient’s 
treatment  
Mental Health Review 
Tribunal 
x The Tribunal reviews a treatment authority within 28 days of it being 
made, at regular intervals and on the application of a patient or on a 
patient’s behalf  
x The Tribunal similarly reviews forensic orders and treatment support 
orders  
x Authorisation for use of electroconvulsive therapy in patients without 
capacity can only be provided by the Tribunal  
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Table 4: MHA 2016 Mechanisms for protecting and promoting human rights of people 
with mental illness, adapted from ‘Guide to patient rights under the Mental Health Act 


































FOs + TSOs 
(per 10,000) 
95% CIs 
1 July 2013 -  
30 June 2014 
104 82 741 - 741 1.57 
 
1.46 – 1.68 
1 July 2014 – 
30 June 2015 
132 95 770 - 770 1.61 1.50 – 1.72 
1 July 2015 – 
30 June 2016 
118 90 792 - 792 1.63 1.52 – 1.74 
1 July 2017 – 
30 June 2018 
105 113 811 126 937 1.84 1.72 – 1.96 
1 July 2018 – 
30 June 2019 
93 95 795 187 982 1.93 1.81 – 2.05 
1 July 2019 – 
30 June 2020 
78 94 778 221 999 1.94 1.82 – 2.06 
       FOs – Forensic Orders; TSOs – Treatment Support Orders; CIs – Confidence Intervals 
Table 5: The number and prevalence of Forensic Orders from 2013 to 2020. 
(Adapted from – Office of the Chief Psychiatrist. Annual Reports (2014 to 2020)  
















 TAs Made TAs Ended Total TAs Prevalence 
(per 10,000) 
95% CIs 
1 July 2013 - 
30 June 2014 
6601 6423 3828 8.11 
 
7.86 – 8.36 
1 July 2014 - 
30 June 2015 
7468 7191 4100 8.58 
 
8.33 – 8.84 
1 July 2015 - 
30 June 2016 
8152 8024 4200 8.67 
 
8.42 – 8.93 
1 July 2017 - 
30 June 2018 
8016 7561 4764 9.44 
 
9.17 – 9.71 
1 July 2018 - 
30 June 2019 
8764 8187 5333 10.47 10.11 – 10.76 
1 July 2019 – 
30 June 2020 
9146 8801 5676 10.99 10.71 – 11.28 
  TAs – Treatment Authorities; CIs – Confidence Intervals 
 
Table 6: The number and prevalence of Treatment Authorities from 2013 to 2020. 
(Adapted from – Office of the Chief Psychiatrist. Annual Reports (2014 to 2020) (State of 





































































1889 82     4.34% 72 49 10965 119 1.08 % 
 
Table 7: Number of Forensic Order (FO) and Treatment Authority (TA) reviews and 
revocations, as well as the number of Treatment Support Orders (TSO) made/revoked 
by the Mental Health Review Tribunal from 2013-2020. Adapted from: (Queensland 
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